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Abstract 
The comparative method grants epistemic access to the biological past. Comparing 
lineages provides empirical traction on both hypotheses about particular lineages and 
models of trait evolution. Understanding this evidential role is important. Although 
philosophers have recently turned their attention to relations of descent (homology), very 
little work exists exploring the status of evidence from convergences (analogy). I argue 
that, where they exist, convergences play a central role in the confirmation of adaptive 
hypotheses. I focus on ‘analogous inferences’ (inferences which take a trait/environment 
dyad from one lineage and project it to another), show how such inferences ought to be 
analyzed and suggest three methods for strengthening their evidential weight.  
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Introduction 
This paper fills a gap in philosophical understanding of biological reasoning: the use of 
analogy (roughly the independent evolution of similar traits) as evidence. As appeal to 
analogous evidence is ubiquitous in supporting evolutionary explanation, understanding 
its role is important. Moreover, a growing body of work has examined and emphasized 
the role of homologies - traits which are ancestrally related. No similar philosophical 
corpus exists for analogy. If relations by descent are important, then we might think that 
the contrasting notion of analogy also deserves attention. The central aim of this paper is 
to show that analogy has a primarily evidential role in biology and to outline how 
hypotheses, explanations and theories are supported by analogies. We need a handle on 
what kind of explanations they support, and what an analogy is. I begin with an 
illustration of a hypothesis, show how analogies test it, and then motivate a philosophical 
account of analogy as evidence. 
 
Explanations in evolutionary biology rely on claims about the past. Henneburg et al 
([1997]), for instance, claim that human fingerprints are an adaptation for grasping 
branches. In our ancestors’ arboreal environment there was selection pressure against 
falling from trees. Fingerprints, the story goes, helped avoid this - individuals with this 
feature tended to survive when their conspecifics did not. Over evolutionary time, then, 
the trait spread throughout the population. How do we test this hypothesis against 
competing explanations? After all, fingerprints may have been an ancestral trait; our 
forbearers may have been fingerprinted prior to taking to the trees. Fingerprints could be 
an exaptation: evolved for some other purpose, they were put to use in grasping. Perhaps 
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fingerprints are unrelated to arboreal environments. We need evidence about timing and 
distribution: that fingerprints evolved in our lineage while in an arboreal environment; 
and evidence about function: that they evolved because they assisted in grasping. 
Similarities between different lineages provide empirical traction on such claims. This 
approach to supporting evolutionary hypotheses is part of the ‘comparative method’ in 
biology. 
 
The comparative method plays a central role in the epistemology of evolutionary biology. 
Examining molecular, morphological and functional similarities between contemporary 
and preserved lineages allows biologists to test hypotheses of the relatedness of lineages; 
the timing of evolutionary events; the character of previous environments and ecologies; 
the morphological and functional organization of extant and extinct organisms. One way 
to conceptualize the relationships between similar traits in different lineages is in terms of 
common descent (homology) and independent evolution (homoplasy). If a trait is held by 
two lineages, and their common ancestor also had it, then the trait is homologous. If the 
common ancestor does not hold the trait, then it is homoplastic – it has evolved 
independentlyi.  
 
An analogy is a similarity between two lineages that meets the following conditions, (1) 
the trait must be present in the two lineages, but not in their common ancestor (it must be 
homoplastic); (2) the trait must have evolved in the two lineages non-accidentally. The 
point of the second clause is to disqualify those cases where similarity has the wrong 
etiology to support inferences. For the purposes of this paper, where I focus on adaptive 
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explanation, ‘non-accidental’ should be read as ‘due to the same selective environment’. 
For other contexts, other readings may be appropriateii.  
 
This definition of analogy is a departure from ordinary biological usage. Typically an 
analogy is taken to be any similarity in traits between distantly related lineages, while 
homoplasy is contrasted with homology (technically synapomorphy) in systematics. 
‘Convergence’ itself is typically contrasted with ‘parallel’ (both of which are 
homoplastic) and so is unsuitable for my purposes. I have here taken homoplasy to refer 
to a phylogenetic concept – two traits are homoplastic just in case the common ancestor 
did not have the trait. This is not enough to support evolutionary explanations however, 
as the trait must have evolved due to the same selection pressures. I count something as 
an analogy when it meets these two criteria. 
 
This account of homology, homoplasy and analogy skates over vexing conceptual issues. 
In particular, it appears that judgments of homology or homoplasy depend on our 
perspective. Frequently analogous traits make use of homologous developmental 
resources, for instance the use of pax6 in the development of analogous eyes. If 
underlying developmental continuities are to blame for analogies then this might 
undermine their independence. Indeed Hall ([2003], [2007]) has argued that we take 
analogy and homology as continuous rather than binary. I have two responses to this. 
First, it seems that analogy and homology are not continuous so long as we have a fixed 
level of description. An example of Hall’s is the divergent mechanisms in the 
development of homologous tetrapod digits. In most tetrapods, digits develop through 
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cell pruning. In urodele amphibians, however, digits grow independently. Yet these 
divergent developmental mechanisms produce homologous traits. This does not commit 
us to a graded account: qua trait the digits of tetrapods are homologous and qua 
developmental mechanism they are not. Second, my analysis of analogy in evolutionary 
biology takes such concerns into account. If one wants to think of homology and analogy 
as a single concept then everything I have to say retains its value. The concern of this 
paper is with the use of analogies as evidence, and so to an extent such ontological issues 
must be put aside (they are touched upon in my discussion of parallelisms in 2.1) 
 
With an account of analogy under our belt, we can now see it in biological play. If two 
lineages have independently evolved relevantly similar adaptations in similar selective 
environments, this provides evidence for natural selection’s role in shaping phenotype. 
Analogies are taken to be ‘natural experiments’ which support adaptive hypotheses.  
 
There is a similarity between us and (of all things) koalas. Organisms from both lineages 
have fingerprints. The fingerprints are so similar that an electron microscope cannot 
differentiate between an adult koala’s and a human’s. Moreover, the similarity is 
homoplastic: it is very unlikely that the common ancestor of humans and koalas had 
fingerprints. Henneberg et al claim that fingerprints in both humans and koalas are 
adaptations. Their function is to aid grasping branches, and they evolved due to arboreal 
selective environments. If so, then fingerprints are analogous between humans and 
koalas. Henneberg et al cite this as evidence for their hypothesis that human fingerprints 
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are an adaptation for clinging to branches. That a trait-environment dyad is found in one 
lineage is reason to think it would be found in another. 
 
So, analogies support adaptive hypotheses, but how good is analogous evidence? Despite 
traditional philosophical and biological interest in adaptation, most uses of analogy are 
tentative, uncertain and evidentially opaqueiii. Is it enough, for instance, to cite a single 
case? An account of analogy as evidence provides answers to these questions and allows 
us to examine the empirical support they provide for natural selection’s role in evolution. 
 
Such an account is important on several grounds. First, it illuminates debates about the 
importance of natural selection in evolutionary explanation. Work on testing adaptive 
hypotheses and adaptationism in general has focused on either optimality modeling 
(Orzack & Sober [1994]) or the role of homology (Griffiths [1996]).  If analogues are 
evidence for adaptive hypotheses then they provide a further empirical inroad to testing 
Neo-Darwinian ideas. Evolutionary theorists take worries about adaptive explanation 
increasingly seriously, and this both undermines the potential value of analogy as 
evidence and increases the urgency of using them to support adaptive claims. 
 
Second, philosophical accounts of evolutionary evidence have ignored analogies to their 
detriment. Elliot Sober has given excellent treatments of inference in evolutionary 
biology covering common ancestry (Sober [1999]), drift versus selective models (Sober 
[2008] section 3) and the evidence for evolution against intelligent design (Ibid section 
2). No attention is paid to the role of analogies.  Philosophical accounts which do 
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mention analogies are insufficient. Turner ([2011]) discusses convergence in relation to 
macro-evolutionary contingency but only as a set up to discussion of other methods of 
testing such hypotheses. Griffiths ([1994], [1996], [2007b]) discusses analogy, but in 
unfavorable comparison to homology. His concerns may well be right, but do not 
illuminate the use of analogy in inferences. Sterelny & Griffiths ([1999]) has a brief 
discussion of analogies as evidence but something more systematic is required.  
 
Tucker (chapter 3, [2004]), in a broad discussion of historical inference, discusses 
analogy in the context of comparing explanations which refer to common and separate 
causes. He points out that separate causes may be more likely if there is some functional 
similarity between them: the construction of pyramids in both Egypt and the Americas is 
explained by the common engineering difficulties faced (not cultural exchange); the 
stream-lined forms of dolphins and sharks is explained by the selective environments 
both inhabit (not common ancestry). I am amenable to Tucker’s Bayesian formalization 
of these inferences, but take several important departures. First, this paper is not 
concerned with contrasting the relative merits of inferences relying on homology and 
analogy. This would require a more developed analysis of those concepts, which I leave 
for later work. Second, the point of this paper is to exposit the role of analogies in 
supporting biological (in particular adaptive) explanations of traits, rather than a unified 
story including cultural, textural, linguistic and biological inference. There are interesting 
similarities between these inference-patterns, but their differences run deep enough to 
motivate a separate treatment.  
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There is an extended discussion of the role of analogies in historical inferences in Turner 
([2007]) (chapter 4), and his pessimistic take is an interesting counter to my views. He 
argues that the use of analogy, although necessary for historical inquiry, does not grant 
any epistemic advantage due to the unreliability of such evidence. Too often reference to 
contemporary analogues has led us astray. Of course, picking the wrong model frequently 
does lead to problems for scientists, but I don’t see how this is a problem for historical 
inferences in particular. Moreover, comparing my project with Turner’s is misleading, as 
we have different targets. By ‘analogy’ Turner seems to refer to the use of contemporary 
animals to reconstruct past lineages, without distinguishing between homologous and 
analogous evidence or focusing on any particular kind of explanation. My focus is much 
narrower: I am interested in how a particular kind of similarity (traits which have 
independently evolved due to similar conditions) support historical inferences about 
adaptations. For Turner, reliance on analogy is necessitated by the epistemic 
disadvantages we face in uncovering facts about the past. A discussion of the relative 
epistemic situations faced by ‘historical’ and ‘experimental’ science (or for that matter 
what this distinction amounts to) is beyond the scope of this paper. I do not deny that the 
use of analogues can be misleading – indeed a primary purpose here is to promote the 
careful use of analogies which avoids the pitfalls Turner illustrates. 
 
Given the ubiquity of appeals to analogous data in biological reasoning (see below), such 
meager treatments are surprising. 
 
 9 
Third, an account of analogy as evidence can complement philosophical work on 
homology. In contrast to analogy, comparative inferences using descent have a 
quantified, well-supported method in phylogenetics (See, for example, Sober [1999], 
[2008], [1988]) and homology’s presence in scientific literature is robust and 
unapologetic. Philosophers, too, have discussed the nature of homology (Griffiths 
[2007b]), its explanatory and evidential role (Brigandt & Griffiths [2007], Coates [1993], 
Franz [2005], as well as Sober’s work), its relation to broader questions in biology (Love 
[2007], Matthen [2007], Griffiths [1994]) and to broader questions in philosophy 
(Griffiths [2006]). There is room for analogy in this fertile philosophical soil; given 
analogy’s contrastive relationship with homology an account focusing on homology 
alone provides only half the story. There is much to be said about the relationship 
between homology and analogy in the context of these discussions, but that is not the 
focus of this paper. 
 
Fourth, in some quarters there has been an increasing sophistication in the use of 
analogies to support hypotheses and there could be a fruitful dialogue between 
philosophy and biology in this area. Faith & Cranston ([1992]), for instance, give a 
Popperian gloss on phylogenetic delineation of analogy and homology (see also Faith et 
al [2011]). Evidence for a hypothesis is judged by considering and falsifying alternative 
explanations for that evidence. Braun & Harshman et al ([2008]), for instance, argue for 
polyphyly (multiple evolution events) in ratite flightlessness by methodically eliminating 
possible biasing explanations in their phylogeniesiv. 
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This paper in part bridges the gap between this biological theory and philosophical work 
on evolutionary evidence. However, there is a significant philosophical difference 
between accounts like Faith’s and mine. Popperian corroboration cannot explain the 
success of analogous inferences (particularly in what I shall call ‘integrated 
explanations’) because it does not increase our credence in hypotheses. Moreover, a 
Popperian reading is far too strict for the historical sciences which very rarely deal in 
certainties. I have a more optimistic take on the relationship between evidence and 
credence. An approach more amenable to my view of confirmation would be to 
understand the elimination of biasing explanations in reference to Ian Hacking’s ([1965]) 
law of likelihood: 
 
 Observation O favors H1 over H2 when p(O|H1) > p(O|H2) 
 
This is to say that an observation counts as evidence for one hypothesis over another just 
in case the observation increases the likelihood of that hypothesis more than the other. 
‘Likelihood’ is not mere probability, but the probability of an observation given a 
hypothesis. The law describes when a hypothesis is more probable in virtue of its 
evidence. We should understand Braun et al’s elimination process as testing that their 
evidence does in fact count as such. The strength of the evidence is a further question, 
which this paper addresses. 
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And so a philosophical account of analogy is necessary and promises to be fruitful. 
Before moving on to the paper proper, I ought to make good on my claims about the 
ubiquity of analogous reasoning in biology. 
 
Analogies are important for the work of ethologists, comparative psychologists and 
evolutionary psychologists. Marino et al ([2008]) propose a decoupling of neural and 
cognitive evolution due to divergent neuro-architecture, but convergent cognition, in 
primates and cetaceansv. Sayers and Lovejoy ([2008]) suggest we examine social 
carnivores, which ‘… hunt big game and cache meat, both of which approximate human 
hunting behavior…’ (pp 95), as an inroad to our own hunting past. Plotnik et al ([2006]) 
claim that the discovery of mirror-recognition in a (single) Indian Elephant is good 
evidence of parallel cognitive evolution between elephants, apes and cetaceans. Nathan 
Emery ([2006]) points to the (impressive) cognitive prowess of parrots and corvids – ‘… 
it has been suggested that intelligence in these taxa can only have arisen by convergent 
evolution, driven by the need to solve comparable social and ecological problems 
(pp37).’ The independent evolution of traits is taken to be illuminative of the forces 
which drive them. 
 
In fact, everywhere you look in organismic biology you find appeals to analogy as 
evidence. The most well known convergences are morphological: the flight of bats, birds 
and pterosaurs; the stream-lined forms of dolphins, sharks and ichthyosaurs; the parallels 
between antipodean marsupials (‘moles’, ‘tigers’, ‘anteaters’, etc…) and birds (fairy-
wrens, robins, etc…) and their northern counter-parts. Martin et al ([2007]) examine the 
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visual apparatus of Kiwi, pointing out that their small eyes and limited neural vision-
centers are surprising in a nocturnal, flightless bird (typically birds emphasize sight, and 
the birds with the biggest eyes are usually either nocturnal, like owls, or flightless, like 
other ratites). Their studies confirm that kiwi emphasize both tactile and olfactory 
information, similarly to many nocturnal mammals. ‘This suggests the independent 
evolution in Kiwi and in these mammals of similar sensory performance that is tuned to a 
common set of perceptual challenges presented by the forest floor environment at night 
that cannot be met by vision (Martin et al pp4).’ Again, a link is presented between a 
particular environment and a particular trait. 
 
Paleontologists frequently appeal to analogous evidence. Senter [2007] argues that 
sauropods did not raise their necks on analogous grounds. ‘Keystone-shaped cervical 
centra (‘ventral bodies’ in mammalian nomenclature) at the bases of their necks allow 
giraffes, camelids and birds to hold their necks vertically, but sauropod cervical centra 
lack such shapes, even among sauropods that are typically portrayed with vertical necks 
(46).’ Here several unrelated animals are referred to in order to establish a link between a 
morphological trait and behavior. Sophisticated phylogenetic approaches use analogies to 
test macro-evolutionary hypotheses. Flowers, Galal and Bromham ([2010]), for example, 
use a large data set to hypothesize the spread of halophytes (salt tolerant plants) amongst 
angiosperms. The spread is polyphyletic (containing many homoplasies) but not random: 
some clades appear more likely to evolve salt tolerance than others. The paper claims that 
these analogies provide a research strategy to understanding salt tolerance. Explaining 
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why some clades are more likely to evolve halophytes would be illuminative of the 
evolution of that trait in plants generally. 
 
And so appeals to analogy as evidence are ubiquitous in evolutionary biology. An 
account of biological reasoning ignores this to its detriment, and philosophical work on 
homology cannot stand alone. This paper covers some distance towards remedying this.  
 
The paper is in two parts. In the first I explain the use of analogies as evidence and what 
factors affect their evidential weight. As we have seen, independent evolution events can 
test adaptive hypotheses about those lineages. That koalas have fingerprints and live in an 
arboreal environment supports the claim that human fingerprints are adaptations for 
branch-grasping. They also support more general claims: predictions about other lineages 
and claims about evolution itself (I will call these ‘analogous inferences’). Given the 
evidence from humans and koalas we might make the general claim that arboreal 
environments select for fingerprints, and expect coupling in other cases as well. I present 
a set of ‘dimensions’ which determine our credence in adaptive inferences. As we shall 
see, some analogies are better evidence than others. 
 
Given these concerns the second part investigates how we can bolster the evidential 
weight of analogies. Illustrations will be sketchy and toy-like, but I hope their 
applicability to more complex cases will be clear. In parallel modeling scientists restrict 
analogies to close relatives. As differences between related lineages are more likely to be 
caused by divergence in environment as opposed to development, restricting analogues to 
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close relatives increases their evidential weight. Integrated explanations combine 
analogies with other streams of evidence. If independent evidence streams both support a 
hypothesis, this increases our credence. I argue that in such cases independent evidence is 
‘mutually supporting’: their combined evidential weight is higher than the sum of the 
individual support they provide. Convergent modeling tests a proposed niche-adaptation 
dyad across several instantiations. This both supports the model and provides opportunity 
for refinement. These methods allay concerns about adaptive claims and show how 
analogies are an important stream of evidence for the construction and testing of 
historical hypotheses about biological form and function. 
 
1. Analogous Inferences 
 
This section examines the evidential relationship between adaptive explanation and 
analogy; focusing on cases I shall call ‘analogous inferences’. In 1.1 I explain the 
relationship between analogies and adaptive explanations, 1.2 introduces analogous 
inferences and 1.3 discusses the factors which influence credence in such inferences. 
 
Analogies are evidence for two kinds of claim. On one hand, the explanatory target could 
be the lineage. Henneburg et al cite koalas as support for their hypothesis that human 
fingerprints are an adaptation to an arboreal niche. Alternatively, the target could be a 
general model for the evolution of the trait. They argue that given an arboreal niche, 
fingerprints will be selected for – and both humans and koalas count as evidence for this. 
By either reading, using analogies as evidence require that matches between selective 
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environments and traits in different lineages inform us about the selective requirements of 
trait evolution. In the next part I make explicit the relationship between analogy and 
adaptive explanation. 
 
1.1 Adaptive Explanations and Analogies 
 
What is the relationship between adaptive explanation and analogy? Analogies support 
adaptive claims; particularly in analogous inferences. The success of such inferences 
turns on both contextual information and background assumptions about natural 
selection. This section explain how analogies relate to adaptive explanation and lays out 
the factors which determine our initial credence in whether two traits are in fact 
analogues. 
 
An adaptive explanation of a trait has two steps. First, we postulate an evolutionary 
function, second, that function is explained in terms of selection pressures from previous 
environments. Henneberg et al claim that human fingerprints function to assist grip, and 
evolved due to selection pressures in our ancestral, arboreal environment. It paid our 
ancestors not to fall from trees, and this explains the evolution of fingerprints. The claim 
that koalas count as evidence for this leans on our belief that fingerprints in the two 
lineages are analogues, which requires that both be adaptations to the same environment. 
 
What factors might determine our initial credence in the claim that fingerprints are 
adaptations? Two things to consider in determining adaptation are fit and complexity. If 
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the trait exhibits a clear function, and that function is tied to a particular environment, 
then our job is easy. If fingerprints clearly aid grasping, and grasping only, then irrelevant 
of analogous information we might be happy to infer from their function to a previous 
environment. If, however, the trait is functionally ambiguous we need more evidence. If 
we have well supported adaptive claims about both traits, and it turns out the traits 
evolved independently for the same purpose due to the same environment, then they are 
analogous. So, the fit of the trait-niche dyad partly determines our initial credence of 
inferences made on analogous bases. Additionally, highly complex structures (take, say, a 
lens eye) are unlikely to evolve simply by drift, or for different purposes. The more 
complex the structure, the less likely it is for the structure to have evolved – the demand 
for an adaptive explanation becomes more pressing (Block [1997,] Dennett [1995], 
Sterelny [2003]). Further, a complex structure is more likely to be closely tied to a 
particular function – and thus fit closer to a selective environment. 
 
Whether we take koala fingerprints as an adaptation turns in part on how complex the 
structure of fingerprints is, and how closely they match the postulated function. 
 
Finally, whether two adaptations are analogous depends on their evolutionary 
relationship. If the traits are homologous they do not count as independent data points, as 
we do not need to appeal to common selective environments to explain the similarity.  
Homologous and homoplastic relationships are inferred using phylogenetic techniques, 
producing phylogenetic trees which are hypotheses of the pattern of ancestry and descent. 
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The methods are uncertain, sometimes contentious – and necessary for distinguishing 
homology from homoplasy, and thus for the use of analogy. 
 
1.2 Analogous Inferences 
 
Which inferences do analogies support? First, our confidence in the koala case should 
increase our confidence in the human case, and vice versa. This is to say that the 
observation of fingerprints in koalas, given their grasping, arboreal niche, increases our 
credence that fingerprints in humans evolved for that same function and due to the same 
environment.  
 
Second, and more interestingly, humans and koalas could count as data points for an 
analogous inference. An analogous inference takes a known analogy and projects it onto 
a target lineage. If a particular trait-environment dyad exists in one lineage, this could be 
evidence that it exists in another. Analogies, then, support general adaptive claims. To 
say a dyad is projectable is to say that given certain conditions, occupation of a certain 
selective environment leads to the evolution of a certain adaptation. These adaptive 
regularities are applied in two ways by biologists. 
 
An organism to world inference takes the form trait → environment. If we discover a 
lineage with fingerprints, then we have reason to think they previously inhabited an 
arboreal, grasping niche. In organism to world inferences there are three facts that we are 
relatively confident of, and use these to infer a fourth. We know the analogue’s trait and 
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the selective environment in which it evolved (and thus the trait’s function), we also 
know our target’s trait. As the analogue and the target share traits, this is reason to think 
they also inhabited similar environments in the evolutionary past. In Henneberg et al’s 
case, of course, we have good reason to think that human ancestors were arboreal. Their 
claim is about the function of fingerprints as opposed to selective environments. There 
are, then, two forms of organism to world inferences. One uses the analogy to infer the 
selective environment the trait evolved in, the other infers the function of the traitvi. The 
fingerprints of koalas support an adaptive regularity suggesting both that human 
fingerprints evolved to assist grip, and that this evolved due selection pressure from tree-
grasping. In combination both analogues are evidence for the general claim that a lineage 
with fingerprints occupies, or once occupied, an arboreal niche 
 
A world to organismvii inference is, unsurprisingly, the inverse: environment → trait. 
Given an arboreal, grasping environment, fingerprints will evolve. Say we are 
reconstructing an extinct mammal which lived in an arboreal environment and grasped 
branches. Will it have fingerprints? If we think yes, based on analogous evidence, then 
we make a world to organism inference. Indeed, Henneberg et al claim that ‘… dermal 
ridge patterns [fingerprints] are heritable structures occurring on the skin of those 
mammalian extremities that are prehensile irrespective of the taxonomic affiliation of an 
animal… (Ibid pp 2, my italics)’ Which is to say, in all mammals with prehensile digits, 
given the right environment, fingerprints will evolve. We contrast our target with the 
adaptive model the analogues support, and infer the target’s phenotype given their 
environment. 
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So far, in 1.1 we have seen that our initial credence in whether traits are analogous, our 
confidence that they are adaptations for the same purposes fitted to the same selective 
environment, is partly set by their complexity and fit. Also, whether the adaptations are 
analogues depends on phylogenetics. In 1.2 we saw that analogues both support adaptive 
claims and are the basis of analogous inferences, which project a trait-environment match 
onto another lineage. These inferences take two forms: organism to world, in which we 
infer a previous environment from a trait; and world to organism, in which a trait (or 
function) is inferred from a previous environment. The next section discusses which 
factors determine credence in analogous inferences above and beyond our background 
confidence set by complexity, fit and phylogenetics. 
 
1.3 Scope, Grain and Specificity  
 
The evidential support of analogous inferences are determined by three dimensions. The 
grain of similarity between the traits and the environment, the scope, or phylogenetic 
distance, captured by the inference, and the specificity, or satisfaction conditions, the 
claim requires.  
 
How similar the analogues are, their grain, affect our confidence in analogous inferences. 
How similar, we might ask, are human and koala fingerprints? Surprisingly so, 
microscope evidence suggests. At a coarse grain convergences in flight are striking, 
having evolved independently in reptile, bird and mammal lineages. However, each flies 
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differently utilizing different structures – at a finer grain the analogies are no longer 
similar (Griffiths [2007a]). Fine grained similarities are more remarkable than coarse 
ones, and more likely to have common selective causes. We can also consider grain from 
the perspective of selective environments. It seems reasonable to suppose ceteris paribus 
that niches that are similar in fine grained details, such as biogeography, available 
resources, etc… are more likely to produce similar phenotypes than coarse grained 
environmental similarities. Fine grained niche spaces will specify adaptations at a fine 
grain. There will be less ‘give’ in available adaptive pathways: evolution will be 
constrained. 
 
Ceteris Paribus, the finer grained the analogues, be it in trait or environment, the higher 
credence we should assign the analogous inference. 
 
The scope of an analogous inference is the phylogenetic distance it covers. It might 
appear that Henneberg et al’s claim has a narrow scope, as it involves only two lineages. 
However, given the phylogenetic distance between marsupial and placental mammals the 
scope is relatively wide. Their claim assumes that, phenotypically, an evolutionary path 
taken by a marsupial lineage is likely to be taken by a placental lineage as well. This 
involves commitments to the kinds of constraints and potentiality those clades hold in 
common. An inference with smaller scope would cover a smaller clade, for instance an 
inference between humans and our closest relatives, Pan, would have a very small scope 
indeed. Note that scope is relative: what we consider to be ‘wide’ or ‘narrow’ will depend 
upon our purposes, the explanatory context, and background assumptions. 
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A wide scope, then, relies on the postulation of a larger regularity across life than a thin 
scope. As a rule of thumb, we ought to consider wide-scope claims as more contentious, 
as the large genetic, developmental and phenotypic differences between distantly related 
lineages are more likely to skew common results from natural selection. Ceteris Paribus, 
we should have higher credence in a narrow scoped inference than a wide scoped 
inference. 
 
A caveat about small-scope inference: in such cases it becomes increasingly difficult to 
identify analogies. As mentioned above, homoplasy and homology are distinguished via 
phylogenetic inference. With a small data set and closely related lineages it is harder to 
confidently distinguish them. It is extremely unlikely that the lens eyes of cephalopods 
and mammals are homologous: their ancient common ancestor only had primitive proto-
eyes at best. Are the patrilocal kin structures of, say, chimpanzees and bonobos (Pan) 
convergent or retained? We can say they are probably retained as most primates are 
matrilocal, and so the most parsimonious arrangement has the common ancestor of Pan 
evolving the trait, as opposed to independent evolution in chimp and bonobo. However, 
given the small data set, our confidence oughtn’t be too high (see Rodseth & Shannon 
[2006] and Chapais [2008] for general discussion of kin distribution in primates). So 
although small-scoped inferences are generally better supported than those of a large 
scope, we might become less confident of the independence of the analogues. 
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Wide-scoped analogies typically lack fineness of grain. After all, large phylogenetic 
distances typically correlate with divergence, take the structural (and perhaps functional) 
differences between the lens eyes of humans and cephalopods, for example. These 
divergences do not completely undermine inferences on the basis of such analogies: two 
arguments in the latter half of this paper show how we can bolster inferences made using 
wide-scope, coarse-grained analogies. 
 
An inference’s specificity determines the level of credence required for belief in that 
inference, it measures the level of detail required by a hypothesis or explanation. 
Compare Henneberg et al’s claim that dermal ridge patterns evolve due to selection in 
arboreal environments to a much less plausible version which argues for the evolution of, 
say, particular patterns in fingerprints. The former claim is less specific as it is less 
detailed. The higher the specificity of a claim the more demanding it is. It would be more 
surprising if a particular pattern of fingerprints was selected for than merely fingerprints 
themselves. The less specific the claim, the less support it requires: the bar of required 
credence is set lower. 
 
Specificity and grain have a close relationship. Grain refers to facts in the world, 
specificity to the demands of the inference. It is important that the facts are fine grained 
enough to support the level of specificity the inference requires. Wing analogues between 
bats, birds and pterosaurs are quite coarse: they are similar in some aerodynamic 
properties and in terms of function, but each uses different structures and different 
movements in flight. For instance, birds fly using their ‘arms’, whereas the wings of bats 
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are stretched across their fingers. The analogy is coarse grained and this has 
consequences for the level of specificity it can support. Take two analogous inferences. 
The first is less specific, claiming that some adaptation to flight would evolve given the 
right set of ecological conditions. The second has higher specificity: given some set of 
ecological conditions, flight with (say) bird-like morphology would evolve. The analogy 
between bats and birds might be at the right grain to support the former inference, but not 
the latter. Because bats use a different morphological arrangement in flight than birds, 
they cannot be used as a data point to support an inference about bird-like morphological 
structure. Coarse analogies, then, are evidence for inferences of low specificity. Fine 
analogies can support claims of both low and high specificityviii. 
 
Examining Henneburg et al’s organism to world inference, then, we can draw the 
following conclusions. Their claim has relatively wide scope as it requires projection 
from a marsupial to a placental lineage. All things being equal, this should count against 
the inference as it is less likely to be true across a wide swathe of mammalian life then it 
would be if it were constrained to close relatives. The trait is fine grained, as human and 
koala fingerprints are almost indistinguishableix. This counts for the inference, as such 
similarities are unlikely to have evolved for different purposes. The claim is fairly non-
specific, as they merely propose the evolution of fingerprints, not fingerprints of 
particular proportions or pattern. This also is in their favour. These three dimensions, in 
combination with background considerations such as complexity and fit, set our credence 
in analogous inferences. 
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A further factor that could affect our credence in analogous inferences (and adaptive 
explanations overall) is our commitment to natural selection’s ability to shape phenotype 
in general. For those who take non-selective influences such as drift, exaptation, and so 
on seriously, claims about adaptations need to be well supported. Fortunately, there are 
strategies for bolstering the evidential weight of analogous inferences, to which I now 
turn. 
 
2. Parallel Modeling, Integrated Explanations and Convergent Modeling 
 
…analogy is at least as powerful a comparative tool as homology… Evolutionary 
hypotheses are well supported when independently derived data repeatedly 
suggest that a particular selection pressure consistently favours a specific 
character. (Kevin Laland and Gillian Brown in Sayers & Lovejoy [2008]) 
 
I have argued that analogy plays a central evidential role in supporting adaptive 
hypotheses and cashed out which factors influence the support they provide. I now take 
up the challenge of explaining how analogous inferences are strengthened, outlining three 
credence-bolstering methods. 
     
2.1 Parallel Modeling 
 
[an analogy is parallel]… if the underlying homology prescribes a highly distinctive, 
detailed and strongly determinative channel of constraint (Gould [2002], pp 1135). 
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One method is Parallel Modeling. Here, we constrain our scope of analogues to close 
relations. Because phylogenetic history constrains evolutionary paths, closely related 
lineages will be more likely to evolve similar phenotypes. As closely related lineages 
share similar developmental resources, the differences between them are more likely to 
be due to environment. By sticking to ‘parallel’ lineages, then, we control for 
developmental noise. Our models are constrained – they describe a putative regularity 
restricted to a particular clade (see Hall [2003], [2007]). This solution is related to the 
‘historical turn’ (Griffiths [1996], Sansom [2003]) in adaptationism. Because 
phylogenetic history plays a large role in shaping phenotype, it ought to be incorporated 
into explanations of it, even adaptationist ones. What then are parallelisms? 
 
Not all analogies are created equal. Some closely related animals have independently 
evolved the same trait from the same ‘starting point’; utilizing very similar 
developmental systems. This is ‘parallel’ evolution. There are conceptual issues here. 
Given that all life on earth evolved from a single event (and so from the same starting 
point) and given that all life utilizes developmental systems based on the same four-base 
genetic structure (and so utilize similar developmental systems), it seems as if all 
analogies are parallel. I need an account of parallelisms that is appropriate for restricting 
the scope of analogous inferences. This involves a return to Hall’s proposal that we take 
homology and analogy as graded concepts. Here I claim that parallelisms should be 
understood in a similar way and argue briefly that an appropriate account refers to the 
kind of causal role played by the underlying developmental resources. 
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‘Parallelism’ is a graded concept. Some analogies will be ‘more parallel’ than others, and 
what determines this will not simply be closeness of relation, or similarity of 
developmental system, but similarities in developmental systems with the correct causal 
relation to the target phenotype. Take the oft-cited homeobox Pax6 gene, for instancex. 
Pax6’s standard description is as a ‘master-control’ gene for eye development. Removal 
of the gene causes the failure of eye development, duplication causes extra eye 
development. Crucially, Pax6 controls eye tokens, not eye types: cross species mixing 
causes extra eye development, but the extra eyes are typical of the receiving species, not 
the donor. Moreover, homologues of Pax6 are used in the development of the convergent 
camera-like eyes of mammals and cephalopods (Tomarev et al [1996]) and the divergent 
compound eyes of insects. Pax6 does not constrain eye-type evolution because it lacks 
causal specificity (Woodward [2010]) – it does not affect the phenomena of interest 
sufficientlyxi. As Pax6 is utilized across the cases we wish to contrast in explanations of 
eye evolution, it cannot explain those differences. A useful account of parallelism, then, 
must exclude causes like Pax 6 and include those which constrain adaptive pathsxii. 
 
In parallel cases natural selection is more likely to be an important cause of the evolution 
of the target trait, as developmental constraints are held in common across the lineages. 
Differences between closely related lineages are more likely to be due to extrinsic, rather 
than intrinsic differences. So, given close relatives, an environment-trait dyad is more 
likely to be robust and easier to test. In terms of analogous inference, if our scope has the 
right kind of constraints, our credence should increase.  
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Henneberg et al’s hypothesis has a wide scope as they rely on an adaptive regularity 
across marsupial and placental clades. In their paper they do consider other marsupial 
lineages, which could support a narrower scoped claim about fingerprints in marsupials. 
First, koalas share a clade with the wombats, vombatiformes (see Phillips & Pratt [2008] 
for phylogenetic analysis), and wombats are neither arboreal, nor have fingerprints. 
Second, the short-tailed spotted cuscus, a more distantly related marsupial (clade 
phalangeriformes), is arboreal, grasps branches, and has fingerprints. Third, tree 
kangaroos are arboreal but do not grasp, and do not have fingerprints.  Each piece of 
evidence supports the hypothesis that in marsupials fingerprints evolve in response to 
arboreal grasping. The first and third strengthen the connection between phenotype and 
selective environment and the second adds another data point.  
 
If the scope of the hypothesis were restricted in this manner we would have higher 
credence in it: because marsupials have similar developmental systems, it is more likely 
that differences in selective environments are to blame for differences in fingerprint 
evolution. 
 
2.2 Integrated Explanations 
 
Scientific evidence and theories do not work in a vacuum. The best historical hypotheses 
draw upon as many evidential paths as possible. Comparative information, then, may be 
an important part of a hypothesis’ support. Our credence is based on the support of the 
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hypothesis as a whole, not its parts in isolation. We can incorporate analogies into 
integrated explanations which utilize multiple evidence streams. 
 
There are two claims I want to make about analogies and integrated explanations. First, 
we take a total-evidence view: we examine the hypothesis and its components as a whole 
when determining credence. This is in part due to my second claim: the evidence for a 
hypothesis can be mutually-supporting. Consider the following case study. 
 
John Horner’s ([1983]) theory that some dinosaurs were altricial (nestbound and 
requiring parental care during youth) relies upon both comparative and fossil evidence. 
He and Robert Makela’s discovery of fossilized Maiasaura nests in 1979 provided 
physical evidence that young were cared for. The fossilized remains showed that adult 
Maiasaur remained at the nest site post hatching and infants did not immediately leave 
the nest. In addition, the design of the Maiasaur nests was similar to bird’s nests (Horner 
[1994]). Basically, because Maiasaur nests look like birds nests, Horner concluded that 
Maiasaur infants had a similar upbringing to extant birds.  
 
Horner draws on two evidence streams to support his hypothesis: fossil and analogy. The 
fossils provide material evidence of Maiasaur life-ways and nest structure which suggest 
altricial behaviour. The analogy with birds supports the claim through a world to 
organism inference. If the structure of bird nests is an adaptation for altricial behaviour 
this is evidence that bird-like nest design evolves in response to selection for parental 
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care in oviparous lineages. The hope is that the design of Maiasaur nests evolved as a 
response to the same pressurexiii.  
 
How would we determine credence in Horner’s conjecture? The evidence both 
individually and in combination paint a picture of altricial behaviour in Maiasaur. We 
cannot treat the evidence individually, taking our total credence as the sum of the 
evidence, as the evidence is related. For instance, the analogy to bird-nest design is used 
by Horner to explain the fossils. The existence of bird nests designed to facilitate 
altriciality makes Maiasaur nests less surprising. This is to say the likelihood of 
discovering fossil nests from altricial lineages is higher given that birds utilize the same 
design for the same purpose. The analogous evidence makes the fossil evidence more 
likely, and vice-versa. If we buy this line, then we must conclude that the total evidence 
for Horner’s hypothesis is in fact higher than the sum of the individual evidence.  
 
Analogous inferences are strengthened when incorporated into integrated explanations. 
Because of the mutually-supporting nature of the evidence, independent and robust 
confirmation dramatically increases credence in the analogous inference. 
 
2.3 Convergent Modeling 
 
I now turn to analogous inferences which are not as constrained as parallel models, or 
parts of integrated explanations. Under certain circumstances, convergent models, tested 
and refined across several analogues, can increase our credence in analogous inferences. 
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The difference between a convergent and a parallel model is one of degree. In the latter 
case we restrict ourselves to a narrow scope, in the former we test across a wide scope. 
 
What is a convergent model? Analogous inferences rely on adaptive regularities 
matching trait/niche dyads. Henneberg et al hypothesize that across all mammals 
fingerprints will evolve given prehensile extremities and occupation of an arboreal 
grasping niche. In convergent modeling, we test this wide-scoped hypothesis across a set 
of analogues. This has two results. First, the model is supported by confirming cases. 
Second, the model can be refined as we discover exceptions.  
 
Hoppit et al’s ([2008]) model of the evolution of teaching in hominids uses meerkats as 
an analogue and is an excellent opportunity for convergent modeling. Thornton & 
Mcauliffe ([2006]) demonstrate that meerkats teach scorpion hunting to their pups by 
providing debilitated scorpions in response to begging calls. This counts as teaching 
according to Caro & Houser’s ([1992]) functional definition. Roughly, an individual is 
teaching just in case they modify their behavior in some way which does not benefit their 
carrying out of the skill in question, but increases the chance of uptake. If your aim is to 
hunt and kill a scorpion, biting off its sting and giving it to a pup to play with is terribly 
inefficient; however, if you want your offspring to learn to hunt scorpions, this behavior 
will help. 
 
Based on their observations of meerkats, Hoppit et al hypothesize that teaching evolves 
given three variables. First, the population must include inadvertent social learners; they 
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must have the cognitive acumen to learn through trial and error. Indeed, Meerkats do 
learn through trial and error. Second, there must be a selective advantage for the tutor if 
the pupil picks up the skill. As teaching is a change in tutor behavior, for this to be visible 
to selection it must benefit the tutor. Meerkats are cooperative breeders, and the faster 
pups can fend for themselves the better, so it is a reasonable conjecture for their lineage. 
Third, inadvertent social learning must be inadequate, costly, or at least inefficient, for 
the passing on of the skill; otherwise there would be no reason for selection to favor 
teaching over inadvertent social learning. And indeed trial and error learning is an awful 
way to learn venomous scorpion hunting.  
 
As the first two variables are true of our closest relatives, Hoppit et al suppose that 
teaching evolved in humans due to selective pressure to learn new and more complicated 
skills: 
 
Unlike in other apes, in humans, teaching could have been favored by the 
requirement to transmit complicated skills and technology that are not easily 
acquired through inadvertent social learning. (Hoppitt et al [2008]) 
 
This hypothesis covers a fairly wide scope: carnivora and primates share a common 
ancestor around 85 million years ago, the rodents, primates and carnivores falling within 
that clade (Dawkins [2004]). Hoppitt et al’s organism to world inference, then, has an 
implicit assumption that (for most placental mammals) teaching will most likely evolve 
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given those conditions. At such a scope, we might worry that natural selection’s path 
would be too easily confused by non-selective factors.  
 
Fortunately, teaching has been proposed in many lineages since Caro & Hauser’s paper. 
Hoppitt et al cite eusocial insects (ants and bees), non-human primates (callitrichid 
monkeys), carnivora (cheetah, domestic cats, meerkats) and birds (pied babblers and 
domestic fowl). Marino et al ([2007]) also propose teaching in cetacea. It seems 
reasonable to count five analogues: non-human primates, carnivora, birds, cetaceans and 
eusocial insects. In convergent modeling, we would test the model across these five 
analogues. Clarke ([2009]), for instance, shows that feeding calls in White-tailed 
ptarmigan (a species of alpine grouse) influences diet-choice in chicks: 
 
White-tailed ptarmigan hens display a multimodal signal composed of food 
calling (a distinctive guttural clucking) and tid-bitting (dropping bits of a food 
item with active head bobbing) only in the presence of their precocial chicks… 
Invariably, the chick then pecks at and consumes morsels of the specific food item 
indicated by the hen (Ibid pp27).  
 
The White-tailed ptarmigan meets the requirements of Hoppitt et al’s model. The hen 
points out protein-rich food sources which are difficult to identifyxiv, in an alpine 
environment food is scarce and so trial and error learning could lead to starvation, the 
chicks retain eating preferences into adulthood, birds typically learn through trial and 
error, and so on. This supports Hoppitt et al’s model, increasing our credence both in the 
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model and the hypothesis that teaching evolved in our lineage in response to similar 
needs. 
 
Both convergent and parallel modeling can have a further effect: refining the model. 
Exceptions are not necessarily falsifying but can lead to improvement. An example of 
refinement comes from primatology. Testicular size is used a measure of sperm 
competition in primates (Harcourt [1995]). In a promiscuous environment there is 
selection for male investment in sperm production, which is manifested in larger teste 
size. As there is selection against heavy sperm production in non-promiscuous 
environments, a primate’s testicle to body ratio ought to be a signal of their breeding 
strategy. This is the basis of a quantified model: teste size against body mass predicts 
breeding strategy.  
 
In Jolly & Phillips-Conroy’s ([2006]) study of teste size in baboons, yellow baboons did 
not fit the model. By a measure of body-mass to testicular size their testes were too small 
given their promiscuous breeding strategy. On reflection, Jolly & Phillips-Conroy 
realized that the unusually long, heavy arms of that lineage skewed the result. ‘It is 
evidently the relatively long (and thus proportionately heavy) limbs of yellow baboons 
that make them appear to have smaller testes, when total body mass is used as the 
standard (Ibid pp 267).’ By measuring teste size relative to trunk mass the yellow 
baboons were fit to the model – and the model itself was refined. Moreover, this 
approach provides research strategies: given Hoppit et al’s hypothesis we should examine 
teaching in particular animals, and its phylogenetic spread overall. 
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And so testing adaptive models across groups of analogues both increases our credence in 
the model even if the scope is wide, and can result in refinements. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Analogy is an important empirical stream of evidence for both inspiring and 
corroborating adaptive hypotheses. It deserves some measure of the philosophical 
attention paid to homology. I have explained analogy’s use in supporting adaptive claims 
both about single lineages and evolution more generally, as well as showing which 
factors affect their evidential weight. Coarse grained analogies supporting wide scope, 
highly specific inferences are problematic. However, through parallel and convergent 
modeling, as well as incorporating analogies into integrated explanations, such worries 
can be partly mitigated. 
 
Much work remains. In light of the importance of analogy as evidence, a reassessment of 
the ontological and epistemic relationship between homology and analogy is in order. 
Also, historical linguistics, archaeology, and other fields make use of something very 
similar to analogy and whether this paper’s position is extendable into those domains is 
an open question. Moreover, the use of non-adaptive analogies in biology deserves 
attention. Finally, a general account of biological epistemology must incorporate the role 
of analogies into its framework. 
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If we are to draw on the bounty of natural analogous experiments, while respecting 
contemporary concerns about constraint and non-selective forces in evolution, we must 
adopt a more careful approach to analogous inference. After all, our window to the past is 
opaque – so any available solvents ought to be rigorously applied.  
Adrian Currie 
c/o Philosophy, ANU RSSS  
Coombs (building 9) 
ACT, 0200 
 
Adrian.currie@anu.edu.au 
Acknowledgements 
This paper has benefited from comments from Rachael Brown, Ben Jeffares, Daniel 
Nolan and, in particular, Kim Sterelny. Early drafts were presented at the Australasian 
Association of Philosophy general conference in Melbourne and the SANU workshop in 
Sydney, as well as to the graduate students at both Victoria University of Wellington and 
Australia National University. I would also like to thank four anonymous referees for 
extremely generous comments. 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Amundson, R. Lauder, G. (1994). "Function without purpose: the uses of causal role 
function in evolutionary biology." Biol Philos 9(4): 443-470. 
 
Block, N (1997). “Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back” Nous 31 (11) 107-132 
 36 
 
Braun, E. L., J. Harshman, et al. (2008). "Phylogenomic evidence for multiple losses of 
flight in ratite birds." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 105(36): 13462-13467. 
 
Brigandt, I & Griffiths, P (2007). "The importance of homology for biology and 
philosophy." Biol Philos 22: 633-641. 
 
Callaerts, P. Halder, G. Gehring, WJ. (1997). "Pax-6 in Development and Evolution." 
Annual Review of Neuroscience 20(1): 483-532. 
 
Conway-Morris, S. (2003). Life's Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe. 
Cambridge, University Press. 
 
Caro, TM. Hauser, MD (1992). "Is there evidence of teaching in non-human animals?" 
Quarterly Review of Biology 67: 151-174. 
 
Chapais, B. (2008). Primeval Kinship, Harvard University Press. 
 
Clarke, JA. (2009) "White-tailed ptarmigan food calls enhance chick diet choice: learning 
nutritional wisdom?" Animal Behaviour 79(1) 25-30 
 
 37 
Clayton, NS. Dally, JM. Emery, NJ. (2007) “Social cognition by food-caching corvids. 
The western scrub-jay as a natural psychologist”. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 362, pp 507-522 
 
Coates, M. (1993). "Ancestors and Homology." Acta Biotheoretica 41: 411-424. 
 
Dawkins, R. (2004). The Ancestor's Tale, Phoenix. 
 
Dennett, D C. (1995). Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Simon & Schuster. 
 
Emery, N J. (2006) “Cognitive Ornithology: the evolution of avian intelligence” Phil. 
Trans. R. Soc. B 361, pp 23-43 
 
Faith, D. P., F. Kohler, et al. (2011). "Phylogenies with Corroboration Assessment." 
Zootaxa(2946): 52-56. 
 
Faith, D. P. and P. S. Cranston (1992). "Probability, Parsimony, and Popper." Systematic 
Biology 41(2): 252-257. 
 
Flowers, T. J., H. K. Galal, et al. (2010). "Evolution of halophytes: multiple origins of 
salt tolerance in land plants." Functional Plant Biology 37(7): 604-612. 
 
Franz, NM. (2005). "Outline of an explanatory account of cladistic practice." Biology and 
Philosophy 20: 489-515. 
 38 
 
Gould, SJ. (2002). The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, Harvard University Press. 
 
Griffiths, P. E. (2007a). Evo-Devo Meets the Mind: Towards a Developmental 
Evolutionary Psychology. Integrating Evolution and Deveopment: From Theory to 
Practice. R. B. Sansom, Robert N, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
Griffiths, P. E. (2007b). "The phenomena of homology." Biol Philos 22: 643-658. 
 
Griffiths, P. E (2006). Function, Homology, and Character Individuation. Philosophy of 
Science 73 (1):1-25. 
 
Griffiths, PE. (1996). "The Historical Turn in the Study of Adaptation." The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47(4): 511-532. 
 
Griffiths, P. E. (1994). "Cladistic Classification and Functional Explanation." Philosophy 
of Science 61(2): 206-227. 
 
Hacking, I. (1965). Logic of statistical inference. Cambridge Eng., University Press. 
 
Hall, D. (2007) “Homoplasy and homology: dichotomy or continuum?” Journal of 
Human Evolution 52: 473-479 
 
 39 
Hall, D. (2003) “Descent with modification: the unity underlying homology and 
homoplasy as seen through an analysis of development and evolution” Biol. Rev. 78: 
409-433 
 
Harcourt, A. H. (1995). "Sexual selection and sperm competition in primates: What are 
male genitalia good for?" Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews 4(4): 
121-129.. 
 
Henneberg, MJ. Lambert, KM. Leigh, CM. (1997). "Fingerprint Homoplasy: koalas and 
humans." naturalSCIENCE 1. 
 
Hoppitt, WJ. Brown, GR. Kendal, R. Rendell, L. Thornton, A. Webster, MA. Laland, KN 
(2008). "Lessons from Animal Teaching." TREE 976. 
 
Horner, J. (1994). Comparative taphonomy of some dinosaur and extant bird colonial 
nesting grounds. Dinosaur Eggs and Babies. K. H. Carpenter, Karl F & Horner, John. 
New York, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Horner, J. R. (1983). "Cranial Osteology and Morphology of the Type Specimen of 
Maiasaura peeblesorum (Ornithischia: Hadrosauridae), with Discussion of Its 
Phylogenetic Position." Journal of Vertebrate Paleontology 3(1): 29-38. 
 
 40 
Jolly, C. Phillips-Conroy, J. (2006). Testicular Size, Developmental Trajectories, and 
Male Life History Strategies in Four Baboon Taxa. Reproduction and Fitness in Baboons, 
Springerlink: 257-275. 
 
Love, AC (2007). "Functional homology and homology of function: biological concepts 
and philosophical consequences." Biol Philos 22: 691-708. 
 
Marino, L. Connor, RC. Fordyce, RE. Herman, LM. Hof, PR. et al. (2007) "Cetaceans 
Have Complex Brains for Complex Cognition." PLoS Biology 5(5). 
 
Martin, GR. Wilson, K. Wild, JM. Parsons, S. Kubke, MF. Corfield, J. (2007). “Kiwi 
Forego Vision in the Guidance of Their Nocturnal Activities.” PLoS ONE 2: e198 
 
Matthen, M. (2007). “Defining vision: what homology thinking contributes” Biol Philos 
(2007) 22:675–689 
 
Orzack, S. Sober, E (1994). “Optimality models and the test of adaptationism”. American 
Naturalist 143: 361-380 
 
Phillips, MJ & Pratt, RC (2008). "Family-level relationships among the Australasian 
marsupial "herbivores" (Diprotodontia: Koala, wombats, kangaroos and possums)." 
Molecular Phylogenetics and Evolution 46(2): 594-605. 
 
 41 
Plotnik, JM. de Waal, F. Reiss, D (2006). "Self-recognition in an Asian Elephant." PNAS 
102(45): 17052-17057. 
 
Powell, R. (2007). "Is convergence more than an analogy? Homoplasy and its 
implications for macroevolutionary predictability." Biol Philos 22: 565-578. 
 
Rodseth, LN. Shannon, A. (2006). The Impact of Primatology on the Study of Human 
Society. Missing the Revolution: Darwinism for Social Scientists. J. H. Barkow, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Sansom, R. (2003). "Constraining the adaptationism debate." Biology and Philosophy 18: 
493-512. 
 
Sayers, K & Lovejoy, O C (2008). "The Chimpanzee Has No Clothes." Current 
Anthropology 49(1). 
 
Sober, E (2008) Evidence and Evolution: the logic behind the science Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Sober, E. (1999). "Modus Darwin." Biology and Philosophy 14(2): 253-278. 
 
Sober, E (1988). Reconstructing the Past, MIT Press. 
 
 42 
Sterelny, K. (2005). "Another view of life." Studies in the History and Philosophy of the 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36: 585-593. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2003). Thought in a hostile world, blackwell. 
 
Sterelny, K. and P. E. Griffiths (1999). Sex and death : an introduction to philosophy of 
biology. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press. 
 
Thornton, A. & McAuliffe, K. (2006). "Teaching in Wild Meerkats." Science 313(5784): 
227-229. 
 
Tomarev, S. Callearts, P. Kos, L. Zinovieva, R. Halder, G. Gehring, W. Piatigorsky, J. 
(1997). "Squid Pax-6 and eye development." Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America 94(6): 2421-2426. 
 
Tucker, A. (2004). Our knowledge of the past : a philosophy of historiography. 
Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Turner, D. D. (2007). Making prehistory : historical science and the scientific realism 
debate. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press. 
  
Turner, D. D. (2011). Paleontology : a philosophical introduction. Cambridge ; New 
York, Cambridge University Press. 
 43 
 
Woodward, J. 2010 "Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of 
Levels of Explanation." Biology and Philosophy 25(3) 
                                                 
i This is a taxic definition of homology and homoplasy, tied to phylogenetics. There are other approaches 
which are quite different in character. I think Griffiths ([2007b]) is right in claiming that taxic homology 
should be understood as an explanation of similarity in biology. Given that my target is the explanatory and 
evidential uses of analogy, the taxic account is appropriate. 
ii For instance, we might infer the nature of developmental constraint in reference to two independently 
evolved non-functional characters. 
iii Simon Conway-Morris ([2003]) is a striking exception. It is a rich source of examples of analogy; 
however his claim that convergence provides evidence that life is massively non-contingent due to selective 
constraint is not supported by the analogies he cites (see Sterelny [2005] for critical discussion). In terms of 
the analysis I introduce later, the wide scope and high specificity of Conway-Morris’ claim demand a very 
high standard of evidence indeed, which extant cases of analogy simply cannot provide. 
iv I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this work. 
v Interestingly, Clayton et al [2007] make a similar claim in relation to avian cognition: ‘… since birds do 
not have the typical six-layered cortex found in humans and other mammals, this divergence in structural 
organization of the brain raises the question of whether these cognitive abilities are achieved by similar or 
different neurocognitive mechanisms in the avian and mammalian brain (pp 520).’ 
vi  We might question whether claims about function are claims about the world. I take it that there are 
truths about whether a trait was selected for in previous environments, and insofar as this sets the proper 
function of the trait, then this is a fact about the world. Further, ‘activity’ function, which makes no claim 
about the evolutionary history of a trait (see Amundsen & Lauder [1994] & Love [2007]), is at least in part 
a claim about the world. Our interests may set the functions we seek, but those functions are found in the 
organization of the phenomenon and its components. 
vii Thanks to Kim Sterelny for the ‘organism to world’ and ‘world to organism’ terms here. 
viii The question of grain is important for Paul Griffiths’ issues with shallowness in analogy. As he puts it, 
‘It is a truism in comparative biology that similarities due to analogy (shared selective function) are 
“shallow”. The deeper you dig the more things diverge (Griffiths [2007a], pp 216).’ If it turns out that 
analogies are usually coarse grained, then we can only employ them in the defense of ‘shallow’, or less 
specific, claims. In part, the considerations in the second half of the paper serve to counter these worries. 
ix The environment, however, is not particularly fine grained: merely inhabiting an arboreal, grasping niche 
is mentioned. However, given the specificity this is perhaps all that is required. 
x See Callearts et al ([1997]) for a thorough, if dated, overview 
xi See Powell ([2007]) for a similar approach to parallelisms, as well as Gould’s ([2002]) discussion of 
‘pharaonic bricks’ and ‘corinthian columns’ 
xii Gould ([2002]) provides a example in the form of maxillipedalism, the transformation of limbs into 
eating apparatus in crustacea. The developmental triggers which controls these transformations across the 
clade have been identified and provide an ‘… operational basis… to firm and testable explanations… (Ibid  
pp 1132).’ 
xiii  Of course the appropriateness of this example turns on whether nest-building in birds and Maiasaur is 
homologous or homoplastic. This is a difficult claim to support or undermine, given the difficulty of tracing 
dinosaur nesting behaviour. Even if the example fails in the details, its lesson does not: if nest building is 
analogous between the two lineages, then Horner’s argument is best cashed out in my terms. I am grateful 
to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
xiv Fowl have very few tastebuds, and Clarke suggests that without motherly intervention the chicks do not 
identify these protein-rich foods. 
